An attacker can, in theory, initiate the deliberate overloading from any location, as long as the target computer is connected to the internet. But as a consequence, direct access to the data traffic is now much more difficult if the intruder’s computer is not on the same subnet. This is because data packet interception is only possible with the help of the corresponding packet sequencing number – an undertaking that today is almost impossible from the outside, compared to earlier days of data hacking.
In the past, operating systems and network devices generated transaction numbers which were entered in the TCP header, always using the same pattern. Attackers could easily send extra packets to the targeted systems for test purposes, and thanks to the receipts, predict the next sequence numbers. The package behind the number could now read or manipulate it and then forward it with a fake sender IP, all without being registered by the two communicating systems. Because many systems rely on host-based log-in procedures, the transferred login data such as usernames and passwords is unencrypted and attackers can with some luck actually establish a connection. Since today’s systems randomly output sequence numbers, these so-called TCP-Sequence-Prediction attacks (also known as blind spoofing) have become basically ineffective – but older devices are still at risk.
If an IP spoofer moves in the same subnet – for example, in a local network – as the attacked system, it has a much easier time reaching the sequence number or the IP packets behind it. Instead of having to painstakingly pinpoint it, it can filter and analyze all of the data traffic and single out the desired data packets. This is what’s referred to as non-blind spoofing.